**Throughout, I intend ‘material’ to contrast with ‘conceptual’.**

[1] What does it mean to “demonstrate” something, in the philosophical sense of the term? Is it just to show that something is true? 

[2] Does successful demonstration require securing agreement? How much and from whom?

[3] What is the significance/status/standing of an argument whose validity can be demonstrated, but whose soundness cannot?

[4] You are presented with an argument that is deductively valid, but the premises of which are either speculative, dependent upon perspective, or otherwise unconfirmable. How impressed are you?

[5] An externalist boasts that his epistemology avoids Gettier cases. An internalist counters that the idea that one could know something without having a good reason for thinking it is at odds with what we ordinarily mean by ‘know’. What makes one argument better than the other?

[6] A Platonist tells you that numbers are “abstract objects” that exist in neither time nor space. A nominalist maintains that numbers do not exist in this sense. Regardless of which position you hold, arithmetic and other activities involving numbers remain identical. What is the significance of the dispute?

[7] A Utilitarian says that we ought to maximize happiness. A Kantian says we ought to act in ways that treat others as “ends” rather than “means.” Suppose that both have valid arguments for their respective views, but neither can demonstrate their soundness. What is the status of their disagreement? 

[8] Have philosophers ever demonstrated anything besides the truth of certain conditionals?

[9] That I ought to maximize happiness is supposed to be based on the “fact” that happiness is the “supreme good.” How would one demonstrate this alleged fact, beyond some stipulation as to the meaning of ‘good’? 

[10] Suppose that happiness being the supreme good is, in fact, demonstrable. In the spirit of H.A. Prichard, might we not ask why we should think that “the good ought to be the case”? And could one answer that question other than by way of some stipulation as to the meaning of ‘good’? 

[11] If meaning is conventional — i.e. a matter of common use — and may vary “locally” or over time, what is accomplished by appealing to meaning(s) in philosophical arguments?

[12] Imagine that for whatever reason, everyone agrees that “the general happiness ought to be maximized.” What is added by demonstrating it?

[13] Suppose that “the general happiness ought to be maximized” has been demonstrated but for whatever reason, no one accepts it. What is the significance of the fact that it’s been demonstrated?

[14] Is there an independent “space” in which demonstrated truths “float,” exerting some kind of force over people’s thoughts and actions?

[15] Is there a common, generally accepted standard of reasonableness?

[16] What is the point of identifying things as “right,” “wrong”, “obligatory,” “forbidden,” and the like?

[17] Empirical investigation tells us what is or is likely (or unlikely) to be the case. Philosophical arguments tell us what could possibly be the case, what must be the case, and what couldn’t possibly be the case. What is the relation of the latter to the former?

[18] Suppose that an empirical phenomenon, X, has never been observed, under any conditions. A philosopher tells you that X is “possible.” What significance does this have?

[19] Descartes deduced that because thoughts have no extension (do not take up space), they cannot be physical and consequently, mind/body dualism must be true. Is the chief problem with this that some of his premises were false?

[20] Is there a way to express the so-called “Hard Problem” of consciousness, without employing metaphors, impressionistic language, or distinctly philosophical terms, such as: “direct access”; “qualia”; “introspective awareness”; “seemingness”; “there’s something it’s like to be a ___”; etc.? 

[21] Panpsychists argue that elementary particles must be conscious, because assuming that they are solves certain problems in metaphysics and the philosophy of mind. Can one discover material things about the natural world this way?

[22] Everything our sciences tell us about consciousness suggests that it is born of nervous systems. Panpsychists maintain that philosophical arguments demonstrate it is a property of elementary particles. What would settle their disagreement? 

[23] Philosophers like David Chalmers say that they can imagine “zombies” with identical nervous systems to ours, but lacking consciousness. What is the significance of this? 

[24] Suppose someone told Chalmers that she couldn’t imagine such zombies. What then? 

[25] Aside from cases where there is an outright logical contradiction  — P and Not-P — how would one demonstrate that something is impossible other than by deeming it “unimaginable”?

[26] In the absence of any logical contradiction, on what grounds would a person call something possible, other than that it is “imaginable”?

[27] People are evenly split — 50/50 — as to whether P is “imaginable.” What would determine which camp is right? 

[28] Is imaginability an “objective” or unwavering quality?

[29] Aside from philosophy, appeals to “transcendental arguments” — X is necessary for the possibility of Y — are mostly found in theology. Does this tell us anything?

[30] What seems more likely? (A) Philosophers can successfully deduce material facts about the natural world, irrespective of or in contradiction with well-evidenced scientific accounts; or (B) philosophers can deduce things about certain concepts we might sometimes employ in conceiving of the natural world, which have no bearing on what the natural world is or is not like?