[1] Propositions have no inherent efficacy, even if they are true.
[2] Thought experiments demonstrate much less than you think they do.
[3] Proving that an argument is formally valid is not particularly impressive or persuasive.
[4] It matters whether you actually persuade people with your arguments, because otherwise, all that you’ve done is written — or uttered — a bunch of controversial propositions. (Note: This doesn’t change if the arguments are printed in journals or books.)
[5] Because philosophy is rife with normativity, being a compelling writer and speaker is essential.
[6] ‘Critical thinking’ does not mean deploying logical fallacies that one memorized earlier.
[7] ‘Surely’ isn’t an argument, but rather a gag from Airplane!
[8] That something is of value means it matters to someone. Values don’t float in an axiological ether.
[9] Unless people actually feel compelled to do or not do something, telling them it is “obligatory” or “impermissible” is largely pointless.
[10] What a moral philosophy does is systematize and codify the philosopher’s pre-existing moral intuitions post-hoc. That philosophers sometimes change their minds does not contradict this.
[11] Aristotle was correct when he said that generalizations are of minimal utility in moral matters.
[12] If we were to forbid appeals to intuition in philosophy, there would be little to nothing left of ethics as a subject. (This is also true of the philosophy of mind and any area that relies heavily on thought-experiments or our responses to hypotheticals and counterfactuals, which is pretty much all of them.)
[13] Ultimately, philosophical ethics is descriptive not prescriptive.
[14] Of all the subjects philosophy takes up, ethics benefits the least from meta theory.
[15] “Warrant” is not a generalizable quality, but rather is inquiry-dependent.
[16] Nothing is “properly basic” outside of a context.
[17] Understanding is not always facilitated by endless analysis and is sometimes undermined by it.
[18] The most significant philosophical disputes are not resolvable by philosophical means.
[19] Wittgenstein was correct in saying that some of the most important things can only be shown and not said.
[20] Concern over what things are made of has led us astray as frequently as it has guided us well.
[21] “What are numbers made of?” “What are social entities made of?” “What are persons made of?” These are terrible questions, the pursuit of which only leads to confusion.
[22] Evolved characteristics of biological organisms inhabiting specific biomes cannot be substrate-independent.
[23] Discoveries in fundamental physics, such as that elementary particles are conscious, cannot come from philosophical arguments.
[24] Philosophers love to “imagine a radically different version of X.” The trouble is, if it is too radically different, there is no reason to think it is an X.
[25] As things currently stand, very few people want to read academic philosophy. Even fewer will want to read it, if it is written by an LLM.
[26] Philosophies are expressions of distinctively human points of view and of the perspectives of particular philosophers, not neutral descriptions of reality.
[27] Being an expert in the “philosophy of X” or in “X philosophy” does not make you an expert in X.
[28] The concept of dessert cannot be excised from human engagements.
[29] So long as the primary framework within which social interaction occurs remains folk-psychological (and thus, teleological), Hard Determinism will never be viable or credible outside of the proverbial study.
[30] Much if not most of the philosophy of mind and philosophy of action in philosophy today involve what Sellars called “piecemeal reductionism” and are more of a pantomime of inquiry than the real thing.
[31] Too many philosophers have failed to heed Hume’s admonition to “Be a philosopher, but amid all your philosophy be a man.”
[32] Teaching is the most important thing you can do as a philosophy professor, and there is no research accomplishment that will outvalue it.

